Why Pro-Russian Claims Are Most Dangerous Coming From “Our Own”

Why Pro-Russian Claims Are Most Dangerous Coming From “Our Own”

Why do an anti-Putin reputation and a dissident past offer no guarantee of a speaker’s objectivity? And how does trust in “our own” help pro-Russian narratives enter the Ukrainian and European information space under the guise of expert opinion?

In November, Arif Yunusov, a conflict studies specialist and head of the Department of Conflict Studies at Azerbaijan’s Institute for Peace and Democracy, appeared as a guest on a live broadcast of the Freedom television channel. He was commenting on the support Baku provides to Ukraine. The aid is real, he said, but for Aliyev it is “business, nothing personal,” and Baku will not break with Moscow.

As for the aid itself — 159 humanitarian shipments since the start of the full-scale invasion, generators, power transformers, dozens of kilometers of cable, more than $40 million by mid-2024, and new shipments ahead of each winter, all of which the channel reported in the same broadcast — he called it “not all that substantial a sum” and added that “African countries are given even better aid, and more of it.”

The latter is false, and it is a falsehood that a conflict studies specialist who has studied Baku’s foreign policy for thirty years cannot be voicing out of ignorance. He uses his expert status as a tool. Under its cover, what makes it onto the air is not analysis but the narrative he wants to put across — and it goes unchecked because a specialist is speaking.

And in the same breath, explaining why Putin had still not personally apologized for the Azerbaijani airliner shot down by Russian air defenses in December 2024, he came out with this formulation. For Putin, it is “beneath a tsar to speak to his boyars.”

This broadcast is worth reflecting on for what it tells us about how readily the Ukrainian and European information space welcomes experts of this kind — liberals, dissidents, former “political prisoners” with impeccable anti-Putin credentials. They are invited because they are trusted — and trust takes the place of verification.

Meanwhile, they can describe the world in the Kremlin’s words while drawing anti-Kremlin conclusions, and no one notices. Our filter is tuned to enemies, not to the people we trust.

A Dissident With a Kremlin Map

Yunusov is a historian. In 1992–1993, he headed the analytical department in the office of Azerbaijani President Elchibey. During those same months, his wife Leyla headed the information and analysis department of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense under Minister Rahim Gaziyev — the same man who was later tried for surrendering Shusha and Lachin, fled to Moscow, and is still described as a man of Russian Defense Minister Grachev.

To Yunusov, Putin is a “dictator” with a “colonial mindset,” and the solutions Yunusov proposes are anti-Moscow. And yet, in an interview with Novaya Gazeta Europe in the summer of 2025, he said that if Putin had been smarter, he could have avoided going to war — “the whole eastern part of Ukraine was already his,” and now he had “struck his own people.”

Eastern Ukraine “was his” — he did not “lay claim” to it, it was his. The people who live there are Putin’s “own.” The war is bad not because it is a crime but because it destroyed what was already there. This is a map drawn in the Kremlin. But it is being unfolded by someone with the record of a “political prisoner” and a reputation as a Kremlin critic — and that is why it is taken as common sense rather than propaganda.

This is no slip of the tongue. In an open discussion thread on a military history forum where Yunusov has been replying to readers since 2018, the same line of argument has been taking shape for years. The war “could easily have been avoided” if Kyiv had acted like Minsk and “worked” with Russian speakers. “Half of Ukraine” was traditionally pro-Russian “because mostly Russians or Russian speakers lived there.” Putin would have managed to get his own man into power in Kyiv even without a war. “Germany and France were then thinking about putting pressure on Zelenskyy.” The war struck “the regions where Putin’s supporters lived.”

The conclusion is anti-Putin every time — “clearly no genius.” The premises all come straight from Ostankino.

He speaks about his own country in the same way, and what lies behind this is not loyalty but a sense of Russia’s imperial greatness, which he does not approve of but takes as a given. “Russia will not allow Azerbaijan to start a war in Karabakh” — nine days before it began. “We and the Armenians are pawns in great-power geopolitics.” To Aliyev, Putin is “a brother in spirit, but an older brother.” Armenia and Azerbaijan are “younger brothers, not on his level.”

In this picture, neither Ukraine nor Azerbaijan has any will of its own. There are centers of power and territory for them to divide up. Yunusov calls Putin a dictator. But he describes the world in Putin’s words — and conveys that description to an audience that listens to him precisely because he is not Putin.

When a Way of Seeing Becomes a Position

In Yulia Latynina’s case, the same way of seeing things became a position over the course of three years. In the spring of 2023, she supported the Ukrainian counteroffensive. By 2024, in her columns for Novaya Gazeta Europe, the blame for the war already lay with Zelenskyy, who had rejected Putin’s terms, and Ukraine’s only strategy had become “amputation.”

In June 2025, on Zhivoy Gvozd, she said what until then had been said only on the other side of the front line. The war must reach its “logical conclusion,” Ukraine in its current form “poses a strategic threat to Russia,” and what is desirable is “a neutral, multinational Ukraine that remembers its Russian roots.” These are the Kremlin’s war aims as it frames them — coming from a “foreign agent” whom Russia’s Ministry of Justice accused of “receiving funding from Ukraine.”

A month later, Ukraine imposed sanctions on her, and Viktor Shenderovich called it a mistake, noting that her positions were “very far from my own” and that what she had said was “quite appalling.”

That qualification captures the whole mechanism. It is not the Kremlin that defends Latynina but the liberal émigré community, because she is “one of their own.” Berlin-based Echo continues to give her a weekly slot, where she explains that NABU is “a body for the external management of Ukraine,” that Trump’s plan “takes victory away from Russia” and that this is precisely why Zelenskyy opposes it, and that Russia has already won — “in the military, economic, diplomatic, and cognitive dimensions.”

Insider Information as a Commodity

Iuliia Mendel, Zelenskyy’s former press secretary, sells the same worldview at the price of insider information. As early as the beginning of 2025, she was telling Time that seeking to regain territory and join NATO was causing Ukraine to “lose its nation.”

In May 2026, in a two-hour interview with Tucker Carlson, she claimed that in 2022 Zelenskyy “was ready to give up Donbas” and addressed Putin in Russian as “a man of God,” reminding him that “Slavs are killing Slavs.”

Pavlo Klimkin refuted the substance of these claims — in 2022, Putin wanted Kyiv, not Donbas — but the value of those words lay in whose name was attached to them, and the interview was circulated by RT and pro-Russian websites.

In August, she appeared in the French press. In an interview with Le Journal du Dimanche, Mendel called Zelenskyy “the main beneficiary of this war,” attributed Macron’s support to an unwillingness to admit his own mistake, and concluded, “We are disappearing. I watch my country die while I hear applause in the West,” citing Finland’s loss of territory as an example of how to save the country.

Kyiv’s response was unprecedented. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi published a statement in French urging journalists to exercise “maximum vigilance.” He recalled that Mendel had “gained notoriety for spreading manipulative statements that systematically repeat Russian propaganda narratives” and compared her to the Russian propagandist Fedorova, against whom France had issued a deportation order.

By autumn, Mendel had spoken at the invitation of AfD — a German far-right party that consistently opposes military aid to Ukraine and advocates lifting sanctions on Russia — at a session on the “crimes of the Kyiv regime.” She was the only Ukrainian citizen among ten people included in a sanctions package, and in November she was formally notified that she was suspected of high treason.

Conclusion

You do not have to be a Kremlin agent to spread narratives that benefit the Kremlin. It is enough to describe the world in the Kremlin’s terms while publicly condemning the Kremlin.

Claims such as “the east was Russian,” “Russian-speaking means pro-Russian,” “Europe pressured Zelenskyy,” and “small countries are pawns” are automatically dismissed when Solovyov voices them. When they are voiced by a “political prisoner,” a “foreign agent,” or Zelenskyy’s former press secretary, they get through — stamped “one of our own” — and they reach all the deeper the more sincere the anti-Putin conclusion attached to them.

So we cannot switch off our critical ear at the door — whether we are listening to overt propaganda or to liberal and sympathetic speakers whom we are accustomed to trusting in advance. A guest’s biography is no pass onto the air. The pass should be how they see the world.

This article was published by RBC-Ukraine on November 20, 2026.