US-Ukraine peace plans: there are differences, but consensus is possible

Reuters has published the texts of two plans for achieving peace in Ukraine that were discussed between the Ukrainian delegation and US presidential special envoy Keith Kellogg in London on 23 April.

Kellogg brought from the White House a literally one-page vision of ways to end the war. Ukrainian officials provided slightly more extensive counterproposals. Having exchanged documents, the sides parted ways for further consultations.
It should be noted that the American plan was most likely either agreed upon with the Kremlin in advance or was drafted with Putin's wishes in mind. And the Ukrainian plan was prepared taking into account the American policy on the settlement of the war. Thus, there are not many fundamental disagreements in this triangle.

Based on this, we can recognize that both plans coincide by about 70%. That is, the possibility of reaching a consensus between the parties (again, given that the details of this process are known to Moscow) is very realistic.

The Russians are signaling that they are generally happy with the proposals from Washington.

“We are ready to reach an agreement. There are still specific points, elements of this agreement that need to be finalized, and that is exactly what we are doing,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said.

These very “elements of the agreement” were probably clarified by the U.S. president's special envoy Stephen Whitkoff during his meeting with Putin on April 25.

Let us list and analyze the points of the two documents:

1. Both sides advocated a comprehensive ceasefire and the establishment of instruments to monitor compliance.

The Ukrainian delegation only specified that the United States and European countries should be involved in the monitoring process. In addition, our country pointed out that “this is happening in parallel with the preparation of the agenda and conditions for the conclusion of a full-fledged peace agreement”.
President Vladimir Zelensky interprets the latter point in such a way that only after a ceasefire can peace talks begin. In general, the American plan does not contradict this position in any way.

2. The U.S. points out that under a future peace treaty, “Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees” that will be provided by a grouping of troops from European countries that wish to join the mission and possibly states outside Europe.

Ukrainian diplomats want the same, but specify that security should also be provided by the United States. In their opinion, the guarantees should be similar to NATO's Article 5 “as long as there is no consensus among the Allies on Ukraine's membership in the Alliance.”
Also in separate paragraphs they say that no restrictions on the number of Ukrainian troops and their armament, deployment and actions of foreign militaries on our territory are allowed. In this way, Ukraine is trying to get rid of Russia's “wishes” to reduce our defense forces.

3. Both sides declare that Ukraine “can claim” membership in the European Union. At the same time, the United States rejects the possibility of our country joining NATO. Based on the previous point, we see that the Ukrainian side is trying to hold on to this possibility to the last.
4. The United States is ready to de jure recognize Crimea as part of Russia. In addition, they agree to recognize russia's de facto control over occupied Luhansk and the territories of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson oblasts occupied by russian troops.

At the same time, the United States favors the return of Ukrainian control over the entire Kharkiv region. The Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant should return under Ukrainian control, but it will be managed by the US, and the electricity generated will be distributed between Ukraine and Russia. Our side demands full control over the ZNPP, without detailing the issues of its further management and use.

The Kakhovka HPP dam and Kinburn Spit are returned to Ukraine, which guarantees unimpeded passage of Ukrainian vessels along the Dnieper. These two points in the documents fully coincide.

Ukrainian diplomacy insists that territorial issues can be discussed only after a complete ceasefire. An important point in the Ukrainian plan is that “territorial issues start from the line of the current location of troops”. This can be understood as a signal that Ukrainian demands will be modest and will not concern territories remote from the front line.

5. The U.S. and Ukraine are unanimous that a full reconstruction program should be implemented after the war, based on a Ukrainian-U.S. mineral treaty.
   The difference is that Ukraine is also demanding that postwar reconstruction be financed from frozen Russian assets.

The White House is ready to lift sanctions imposed on russia since 2014. Ukraine proposes to gradually ease sanctions “once a sustainable peace is achieved,” and to instantly renew them in the event of new aggression.

Separately, the United States offers Russia bilateral cooperation in energy and other sectors.

6. In addition, there are two exclusive Ukrainian demands, which concern the exchange of prisoners of war on an “all-for-all” basis and the return of all civilians taken to Russia, including Ukrainian children.

Based on all of the above, we can only repeat the thesis that most of the points in both documents are fully or largely the same. In the American plan, it is most likely that some nuances were deliberately not detailed in order to leave room for diplomatic manoeuvre. First of all, this concerns security guarantees.

On the other hand, the Americans deliberately detailed the issues of territorial division and the future of the ZNPP. Ukrainian diplomacy, on the contrary, pays considerable attention to determining the number of arms of the Defense Forces, trying to preserve our right to apply for NATO membership and the extension of anti-Russian sanctions.

All these are ordinary diplomatic steps, the purpose of which is to obtain “cards” on the negotiating table, at the expense of which other favorable options can be extracted.

The Ukrainian leadership and our entire society are reacting most painfully to the point in the American plan that concerns the legal recognition of Crimea as Russian. The director of the Europe and Peace program at the International Renaissance Foundation, Dmytro Shulga, believes that the United States can do this “over Ukraine's head” - together with Russia by voting for the relevant declaration at the UN Security Council.

On the other hand, periodic public opinion surveys conducted by the Kiev Institute of Social Research show a gradual increase in the number of Ukrainians willing to make territorial concessions for the sake of achieving peace as soon as possible. In March 2025, there were already 39% of such people against 50% who are not ready to give up an inch of land to the aggressor at any price. A little more than a year ago, the statistical disproportion was much more serious - 26% against 65%.

Thus, after another six months this trend is likely to become stronger. The only question is how the positions of the parties will have changed by that time, how much more it will cost the lives of Ukrainians, and whether the United States will retain its peacekeeping attitude, even though many may not like it now.

The question of Crimea's belonging at this stage has a purely political coloring - it is obvious that we cannot return it militarily now. Therefore, we can assume that Zelensky will at least try to postpone its decision for longer, trying to get rid of the negative factors of such a step.
At the same time, it should be taken into account that the American draft does not mention russia's full control over four Ukrainian regions - Donetsk, lugansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson - which has long been a “sacred cow” for the russian leadership. It is not hard to guess that these maximalist tendencies were also a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

Ukrainians have already practically discarded their previously publicized aspirations to return to the 1991 borders, and even the 2022 borders are now hard to believe in. A more or less realistic diplomatic combination under Trump's patronage is now much closer than hypothetical “black swans” like Putin's sudden death or a new (this time successful) military coup in Russia.

Following the April 25 meeting between Whitkoff and Putin, the Kremlin said it discussed the resumption of direct talks between Ukraine and Russia. It seems that the process is moving towards a freeze.